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In the 2025 Indonesia Open, Anders
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Antinson finally grabbed his first title
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after coming up runner up at the same
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tournament in 2024 and 2019.
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Today, we're going to study his finals
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match against Choten Chen and share some
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ideas that you could implement in your
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own gameplay. Let's jump right in.
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To kick things off, it would be good to
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talk about each player's strengths and
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how they want to play. Chinchin is known
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for his explosive movements where he
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does an amazing job of jumping out and
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attacking in the back court. Anders
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Anson, on the other hand, is almost the
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complete opposite. He rarely opts for
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explosive jumpouts and smashes in the
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back court and instead often plays to
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win at the net. In his game against Cho,
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Antonson was able to both play toward
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his strengths and neutralize Cho's
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strengths with a couple of strategies
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alongside Cho's own mistake. Let's
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actually start with Cho's mistake.
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What immediately stood out to us in this
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match was how often Cho lost at the net.
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Cho blocked way too much to Antonson's
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backhand corner, and we have no idea why
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he opted for that shot so much. Yes,
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getting your opponent to turn their body
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as often as possible is advantageous,
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but it's much more effective if you're
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moving them from their forehand position
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first. Chosen nets toward Antinson's
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backhand were often played without
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moving Antonson around first.
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This problem is amplified because chosen
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nets also generally felt too loose. They
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were too slow and often gave Antonson
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opportunities to play even better nets
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or change the pace of the game.
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Additionally, it doesn't make sense why
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Cho would play toward Antinson's
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backhand net area so much when one of
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Cho's best attacking shots in his around
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the head is his cross smash. If Cho
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plays to Antonson's backhand net area
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and he lifts to Chu's around the head,
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Antonson is already naturally more in
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position to move back to his backhand
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and around the head as he just played a
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shot in that area. This means that Cho
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has essentially made one of his best
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shots less effective. Instead, it made
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far more sense to play nets toward the
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middle or Antonson's forehand side more
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often. You can still block to Antonson's
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backhand, but it made way more sense to
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hit to the forehand side before. If Cho
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hit to Antonson's forehand and he lifts
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straight, Cho would have had phenomenal
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opportunities to use his around the head
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cross smash and force Antinson to move
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the full distance. Blocking toward the
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middle would have also helped Cho make
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use of his jumpouts much more. The angle
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of the returning shot from the middle is
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generally easier to deal with. And when
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you're playing an opponent like Choten
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Chen, who has a phenomenal ability to
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jump and cut off pushes, you'll really
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have to watch the height of your shots.
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Additionally, we think that Cho could
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have also played to the back court more
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often. At least from a viewer
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perspective and compared to other pros,
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Antonson's back court is not that
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deadly. There was definitely a world
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where Cho could have opted for more
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reifts and drive blocks whenever
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Antinson played down in the back court
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because Antinson often plays to follow
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up quickly at the net. If Cho caught him
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more often and forced Antinson to
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respect shots coming back to the back
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court, Anton would have had a much more
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difficult time to move early toward the
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net and execute his strategy.
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Furthermore, Chu also could have opted
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for further and faster blocks with a
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more patient play. One thing to
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recognize is that Antonson rarely opts
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for clears in his back court and hardly
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turns on his around the head. A game
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centered around moving Antonson around
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the court and preventing him from
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playing tight net shots definitely could
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have been a more efficient way for Cho
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to play. Wow, athletic play.
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But even if Cho made those changes,
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there's no guarantee that he would have
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won the match. Anton may not have the
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most explosive backcourt or be the
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fastest player on court, but he does
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have some of the best game sense and
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shot changes on the circuit. What
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Antonson is particularly good at is
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changing the timing of his swing. Just
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watch this clip a few times.
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What you want to watch for is how
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Antonson moves into the shot with his
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racket and almost like stops his swing
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midway before suddenly speeding up the
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shot with his fingers and wrist.
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This is what ultimately caused Chow to
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hit his smash into the ground. The
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timing of Antonson's shot threw him off
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and had him locked to the ground. And
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because Antonson has so many changes in
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the timing of his shots, it's extremely
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difficult for Cho to find his rhythm and
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move smoothly on the court. Well, left
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play. Good play. It's not just the front
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court where Anton excels at changing the
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timing of his shots, too. In the back
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court, Antonson is also very good at
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changing his shot timings. And in his
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case, the bigger benefit is how Antonson
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is able to stabilize and recover easily.
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As we mentioned before, Antonson is not
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known for extremely explosive backourt
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attack and plays to win around the net.
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This is why he opts to half smash or
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play a fast drop most of the time and
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adjust his swing timing to make sure
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he's already landed on the ground by the
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time Cho receives the shuttle and able
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Combine these skills with Antonson's
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clever tactics and Antinson becomes an
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opponent that's extremely mentally
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taxing to play against. Not only do you
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have to focus on the timing and
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variation in Antonson's shots, you also
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have to have the mental strength to not
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get distracted by Antonson's various
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psychological tactics.
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For example, one psychological tactic he
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used was to look at the umpire after
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every brush that Cho made. And a fault
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that was called on Cho was ultimately
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what made him so mad. Oh, that was
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But beyond outside the game
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psychological warfare, what we should
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really study is Antonson's in-game
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tactics that pressure his opponents
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mentally. Something that stood out in
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this match was how much variation Anton
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had in his serve and service receive. We
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saw a ton more flick serves in this
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match than we normally see in men's
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singles. And Antonson did an amazing job
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switching between slow and fast-paced
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shots. This variation in gameplay forced
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Cho to continuously think about what he
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needed to do and at times even angered
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him and made him play out of his norm.
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Just take a look at these two successive
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rallies. Antonson plays the first one
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with a driver receive. Then on the next
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one, he moves fast like he was about to
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do the same, but suddenly goes for a
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deception and net. You can imagine what
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was going through Cho's head. The fast
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pace in the first rally probably made
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Chiao think that he needs to be ready
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for a faster paced rally. And when he's
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thinking about preparing for the fast
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rally, it's easy to forget to prepare
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for the slower pace as well. It's a
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similar idea with service variation.
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Antonson frequently mixed up his serves,
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which puts pressure on show right before
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the rally even starts. Flick serves in
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particular also tend to annoy opponents
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the most, especially when they're caught
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by it. This extra frustration can make
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one lose focus and even get angry.
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There's some feeling that Antonson did
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have that effect in this game against
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Cho. And you can ask yourselves as you
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did Chu really want to flick in his
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strategy or was he just trying to get
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Good lift from Antonson.
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Overall, this match was an excellent
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demonstration of the importance of
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strategy and tactics in bad mitten.
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This is not just a sport where you can
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outmuscle and outrun your opponents. You
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have to be smart about your gameplay if
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you want to win consistently. Anders
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Anton demonstrated great strategy with
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lots of good intent behind every shot he
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played while Chotian Chen ultimately did
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not put as much thought into his
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gameplay. Both are still amazing
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players. However, and for us badminton
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players ourselves, we should seek out
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the good from each player and avoid
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having the same problems. If you like
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this video, make sure to hit the like
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and subscribe button so you don't miss
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out. Let us know in the comment section
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below what you would like to see next.
